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1There is only one exception to this: UI-beneficiaries are more likely to find jobs near the end of the
period of entitlement; hereafter, the unemployed are faced with a decrease in their income as they flow into
the SA (see, e.g., Lindeboom and Theeuwes, 1993).
1 Introduction
 
It is well-known that the probability of an unemployed person finding a job decreases
over the unemployed spell (e.g. Abbring (1997) and van Andel (1995)). For the Dutch
labour market, this so-called ‘negative duration dependence’ has been confirmed for
recipients of both unemployment insurance (UI), and social assistance (SA) benefits.
1
Various mechanisms may account for the existence of negative duration dependence.
Unemployed job seekers may become discouraged, and consequently search less
intensively for jobs. They may also lose their knowledge and working skills, and or
become stigmatised by potential employers. All these phenomena result in duration
dependence at the individual level. However, even if individual exit rates do not vary
with duration, the aggregation over job seekers leads to duration dependence if there is
variation in the exit rates between individuals. This is because the unemployed with low
exit probabilities will tend to cluster into long-term unemployment. It is not easy to
distinguish between individual and sorting effects, as they exert similar effects on the
aggregate probability of finding a job. The distinction is not only a statistical, but also
a policy issue & in particular with respect to policies that target the unemployed with
bad job prospects.
In The Netherlands, local public employment services use profiling techniques to
determine the individual prospects of finding a job. In principle, profiling occurs at the
moment of entry in UI or SA. Unemployed are assigned to four possible ‘phases’; the
higher a phase, the lower the prospects on work. Each phase comes with its own special
policy instruments. This approach bears two possible risks. First, it is questionable
whether observed, administrative characteristics of the unemployed are sufficient to
estimate accurate profiling measures. Second, individual duration dependence may be
far more important than sorting effects. In that case, more general policy measures
would be more effective in diminishing unemployment.
Over the years, a broad literature has evolved in with different methods for analysing
this question. At the same time, databases have become available that allow for micro-2
2In our analysis, we estimate reduced form models. For an example of a structural model approach where
the empirical duration model is derived from theoretical arguments, we refer to Van den Berg (1990). 
economic analyses, where a distinction is made between sorting and individual effects.
In this paper, we use the Income Panel Research (IPR) database, which consists of a
sample of individual records collected by Dutch tax authorities. This data set allows us
to follow individuals over a long period of time, both in the SA and UI benefit
programmes. With this information, we estimate duration models
2 to assess the accuracy
of profiling for UI and SA beneficiaries. In particular, our analysis addresses the
question which part of the duration dependence effect can be attributed to the individual
effects, and which part to ‘indirect’ sorting effects. 
Our analysis suggests that after an unemployment spell of half a year, the decrease in
the job finding rate for SA recipients can be attributed for 20 to 25% to sorting effects
that are caused by observed differences in individual characteristics. After a three- to
four-year period, the probability of finding a job deteriorates further, but only because
of individual duration effects. This means that the sorting mechanism has ended. For UI
recipients, the decrease in the job finding rate can also be attributed for 25% to the
(same) sorting effects. After a three- to four-year period in the UI programme, the job
finding rate deteriorates further only as a result of individual duration effects.
All in all, sorting effects explained by the observed individual characteristics affect the
job finding rate only in a limited way. The use of additional information (describing part
of the heterogeneity that is unobserved in the current analysis), for example on the
motivation of the unemployed, may improve the accuracy of profiling techniques. Still,
our results indicate that the individual duration effects are more important. As a result,
targeting specific groups (at the moment of inflow into unemploment) alone bears a
great risk of long term unemployment for those unemployed that are (initially) classified
as having good job prospects. Therefore, the profiling techniques require a supplemen-
tary policy to reduce long-term unemployment, e.g. by active counseling and monitoring
all unemployed after a certain period of time. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sheds light on the factors that
determine the probability that a SA beneficiary or a unemployment beneficiary finds a
job. Section 3 briefly describes the estimated duration model. Section 4 describes the
IPR data, after which section 5 presents the results of the estimated model. Finally,
section 6 draws some conclusions.3
3Here, we refer to Devine and Kiefer (1991) for a survey on empirical search models.
2 Factors determining the probability of finding a job
Various theories attempt to explain the job prospects of unemployed job seekers (for a
complete survey, see Jehoel-Gijsbers (1993)). In this section, we briefly explain the
theory that most commonly serves as a benchmark for analysis, job search theory. For
a complete (and more formal) treatment of this theory we refer to Mortensen (1985). 
In job search theory explicit account is taken of the presence of search frictions on the
labour market. Finding a job therefore takes time. The duration of the search process is
determined by the probability of a job offer and the probability that a job offer is
accepted. Various characteristics may influence these two probabilities. Apart from
personal characteristics (like age and gender), one might also think of  the level of the
reservation wage, (former) wage earnings, and the intensity of the search. In general, a
high reservation wage results in a long spell of benefits. However, if individuals search
rather intensively, this behaviour shortens the expected duration of the spell. Job search
theory mainly addresses the behaviour of unemployed job seekers. More recently,
attention has been focused on employees and employers. Job search theory can also be
used as a benchmark for an analysis of education and training. Investments in education
and training increase the human capital of workers, thus increasing the viability of a
match between employers and employees.
All in all, the job finding rate may be influenced by various variables.
3 Possible
variables may include:
(1) Age: The closer a person approaches the age of retirement, the shorter gets the
remaining time horizon, and thus the less attractive it becomes to search for a job. The
advantages of the new job are difficult to explore in a short period, both for a worker and
and employer. 
(2) Work experience: In general, the productivity of an employee increases with work
experience. High productivity - if not firm specific - increases the surplus of matches
with employers. This increases the probability of finding work.
(3) Education: Education is correlated with the productivity of an individual. Therefore,
in analogoy to work experience, skilled job seekers are more attractive for employers.
(4) The elapsed spell of unemployment: The unemployed lose part of their knowledge
and worker skills while under a benefits programme. Therefore, the length of the
unemployment spell can have a negative effect on the job finding rate.4
4As an alternative to this, spells ending in other destinations than work could be treated as incomplete
(‘censoring’). However, given the correlation between the outflow to work and to other destinations, the
result may be that censoring is not random, resulting in estimation biases.
(5) The reservation wage: According to job search theory, the level of the reservation
wage reflects the willingness to accept a job offer. The reservation wage strongly
depends on the value attached to leisure, as well as the replacement rate. Further, raising
children may explain the value that is attached to household activities. Due to traditional
role models, this value may vary between men and women.
(6) Costs and restrictions of the job search process: Generally, high search costs shorten
the search period for a job. Examples are those costs incurred to find a job
(advertisements, newspapers), and opportunity costs like the loss of income while being
on benefits. Further, liquidity constraints may influence the length of the search period.
In contrast to this, credits and partner income may result in a longer search period.
3 The model
Data on individual duration spells are needed to obtain information on duration effects.
In our analysis, a distinction can be made between completed and ongoing spells. Both
types of spells can be used to estimate duration or hazard rate models. The hazard rate
is defined as the rate at which unemployed leave unemployment within a short period
of time, given that one has been unemployed until that moment. In our model, the
hazard is into two possible, ‘competing risks’, that into work and to other destinations.
A large part of the outflow out of benefits, in particular that of SA benefits, consists of
transitions into other destinations than finding a job. It is likely that both risks are
correlated. For example, individuals that have a partner with an income may have a high
probability of becoming nonparticipant, and a low probability of finding work. By using
a competing risks structure, we try to take into account correlation.
4 
For a survey on the econometric analysis of duration models we refer to Lancaster
(1990). In modeling duration effects, a distinction can be made between parametric and
nonparametric models. In the first case, the pattern of duration dependence is restricted
to have a particular functional form, for example a Weibull-distribution; the hazard rate
then increases or decreases monotonically over time. This method has the advantage that
the estimated parameter(s) have a clear, unambiguous interpretation. In case of the
Weibull-distribution, there is only one parameter that describes the pattern of duration
dependence. As an alternative, the pattern of duration dependence can be estimated
nonparametrically. Here, the idea is that imposing a minimum of (functional form)
restrictions results in minimizing the risk of misspecification. Mostly, the hazard rate5
then is specified as a ‘piece-wise constant’: for a number of consecutive time intervals,
the hazard is allowed to vary. We choose for this specification, as it allows to mimic the
non-monotonous pattern of duration dependence in the data.
Unobservable heterogeneity
Various factors influence the hazard into work. Some are observed with the data at hand,
whereas (most) others are not. For instance, the motivation of an unemployed person,
for which the IPR database has no information, has a positive effect on the hazard to
work. As mentioned before, differences in individual hazard rates result in a negative
duration dependence, observed at an aggregated level. Ideally, one would like to observe
all factors that determine these individual differences, in order to correct for them so that
unbiased duration dependence remains. However, this situation will not occur when less
than all factors are observed. In practice at least some unobservable heterogeneity will
remain.
Unobservable heterogeneity can be taken into account in various ways. First, in analogy
to other types of regression, one can model the unexplained part of a dependent variable
as an error term. Some assumptions are needed with respect to the functional form of
these errors terms (for example, by adopting a log-normal distribution). By extending
the model in this way, we are able to measure the effect of unobservable heterogeneity
on duration dependence. A disadvantage of this method is that the outcome of the
estimation may be influenced by the (arbitrarily) chosen distribution of the error term.
Therefore, a more flexible nonparametric method may serve as an alternative, for
example by dividing the total group of the unemployed into two (or more) subgroups
with different levels of unobservable effects. Then, for both (or more) groups the
concerning weights are estimated, as well as the impact of unobserved differences on
the hazard (Heckman and Singer (1984)).
4 The data
Introduction
The IPR (Income Panel Research) database consists of a sample of about 75,000
individual observations, collected by tax authorities over the period 1989-1996. A
number of possible states is distinguished, depending on the individual income status
(SA benefit, UI benefit, wage-income, no income, disability benefit, etc..) For our
analysis, we use 6307 individual observations of SA beneficiaries and 11,465 cases of6
UI beneficiaries. These observations are measured at the moment of entry in these
programmes (as from 1989). For each individual, we observe a complete or incomplete
unemployment spell, together with various individual characteristics.
A number of spells in the IPR database are exactly equal to one year, or a multiple of
this. Probably in almost all cases these spells last at most one year (or a multiple of
this.). Therefore, we make this assumption in the estimation of the model. Table 1 shows
that the subset of these cases does not strongly differ from the total sample of SA and
UI  beneficiaries. This group is only lower educated, older and consists of relatively
many unemployed that have a partner with an income. Possibly, these compositionary
differences, together with the assumption that the subset of observations is assumed to
last at most one year (or a multiple) may bias our estimation results. We tested for this
by estimating the model without imposing this assumption. This did not change our
results significantly, and in particular not the results with regard to the pattern of
duration dependence.  




















Female 0.55 0.015 0.52 0.0063 0.41 0.019 0.40 0.0046
Partner with income 0.38 0.015 0.30 0.0058 0.51 0.047 0.40 0.0047
Child support 0.25 0.013 0.28 0.0057 0.28 0.022 0.28 0.0042
Higher education 0.044 0.0064 0.18 0.0023 0.0070 0.0040 0.0055 0.0021
Disabled 0.021 0.0042 0.029 0.0021 0.13 0.016 0.060 0.0022
Age (in years) 36.0 0.41 30.4 0.14 41.0 0.64 33.2 0.11
Comparing the Income Panel Research database with SA statistics
A comparison of the data from the IPR database with more generally used data of SA
authorities (obtained from local authorities) shows that short spells are observed less
often in the IPR (see table 2). A possible explanation for this is with respect to the
registration of short term unemployed that enter into benefit programmes repeatedly. In7
the IPR these people are counted only once, in contrast to the other statistics. Table 3
reveals that the age and gender distribution are more or less the same in both databases.
Table 2 Comparison of Social Assistance in IPR database with statistics of the
Social Assistance Authorities, stock at end of year 1995 ; duration and
gender distribution
Official SA statistics IPR database
men women men women
Duration in years %
< ½ 18 14 13 9
½ - 1  12 10 16 14
1 - 2 19 16 15 15
2 - 3 12 12 11 11
3 - 4  8 8 7 8
4 - 5 5 6 6 8
>  5 2 63 43 13 5
Total number (x 1000) 246 334 235 345
Table 3 Comparison of the Social assistance in IPR with statistics of the Social
Assistance Authorities (SAA), stock at end of year 1995 ; age- and
gender distribution
Total Men Women
SAA IPR SAA IPR SAA IPR
Age %
18-24 12 13 12 13 12 13
25-34 34 34 37 38 32 32
35-44 25 25 24 22 26 27
45-54 18 17 16 16 19 17
55-65 11 11 11 11 12 11
total number
(x1000)
580 581 246 235 334 3458
Comparing the IPR database with the NISI database
Apart from the IPR database of Statistics Netherlands, the National Institution for Social
Insurance (NISI) administers data of UI beneficiaries. Table 4 compares the distribution
of complete spells according to the IPR and the NISI-data. Just like in table 1, we find
that short spells are under reported in the IPR database. Again, this is due to the way of
registration in the IPR.
Table 4 Comparison of Spells of Ended UI Benefits in IPR
a database with the
National Institution for Social Insurance (NISI) database end of 1995
NISI IPR
Duration in years %
<½ 60 45
½ - 1 14 40
1 - 2 16 10
2 - 3 6 4
3 - 4 2 1
4 - 5 1 1
>5 1 0
Total(numbers in thousands) 590 714
a For a  number of IPR observations the length of the spell is not known. The listed percentages are
calculated on the basis of spells of which the length is known. 
Operationalization of the model 
Given the IPR, the following variables are used in the empirical analysis:
(1) Age at time of moment of entry of the benefit
(2) Education. This (proxy) dummy variable indicates whether a person has received a
scholarship for university education.
(3) Receiving child support, or not.
(4) Having a partner who earns income, or not.9
(5) Gender.
(6) A ‘health-dummy’. This dummy indicates whether person has received disability
benefits in the past. Here, it should be mentioned that not all the disability beneficiaries
in the IPR database can be properly identified. 
(7) Duration of the spell. These are completed spells in the SA or UI programmes.
In chosing these variables, we are aware that this list probably contains incomplete
information on the factors determining the hazard into work. However, our model allows
us to assess the explanatory power of administrative information that is used mostly for
profiling.  
5 Estimation results
As mentioned before, the aggregation over individual job seekers leads to
overestimation of duration dependence. To what extent is this the case in the IPR-data?
In equation 1 we estimate a duration model for SA recipients without using any
explanatory variables, apart from the spells lengths (see first column of table 5).
Equation 3 of table 6 does the same for the UI recipients. Thus, for both equations the
duration effects are not corrected for any differences in individual characteristics. The
estimation results for these equations show a pattern of duration dependence that follows
from individual duration dependence, together with that from sorting effects. In
equations 2 and 4 we add a number of explanatory variables (like gender and age). This
results in a less steep pattern of negative duration dependence; differences in the
observed individual characteristics lead to sorting effects. The differences in duration
dependence between the two equations (1 and 3, respectively, with 2 and 4) indicate the
size of these (measurable) sorting effects.
The first columns of table 5 and table 6 indicate that duration dependence for both the
SA and the UI benefits is more prominent with respect to the hazard to work than that
to other destinations. The hazard to work strongly diminishes already in the first two
years. The pattern of negative dependence with respect to the hazard to other
destinations reasons differs between the SA and UI benefits programmes: in contrast to
the SA, additional negative duration dependence effects end after around three years for
UI.
Generally, the coefficients in equations 2 and 4 have the expected signs. For instance,
we find that women find a job less quickly than men. Also, for SA benefit programmes
we find a negative impact of partner income, or raises and child support. Unemployed10
Table 5 Analysing the sorting effect: comparing equations 1 and 2 (Social
Assistance)
Equation 1 Equation 2  Difference
Number of observations 6307 6307
Log-likelihood  6 19419.3 6 18902.1
Hazard to work coefficient std. error coefficient std. error coefficient std. error
Constant 6 2.70 0.025 6 2.29 0.044
Woman 6 0.26 0.043
Working Partner 6 0.14 0.056
Child support 6 0.48 0.062
Highly educated 0.59 0.051
Disabled 6 1.16 0.28
age 25-35 years 6 0.42 0.053
age 35-45 years  6 0.64 0.084
age 45-65 years 6 1.55 0.12
6-12 months spell 6 0.74 0.060 6 0.58 0.060 0.16 0.085
12-24 months spell 6 1.46 0.074 6 1.17 0.074 0.29 0.10
24-36 months spell 6 1.84 0.11 6 1.46 0.11 0.37 0.16
36-48 months spell 6 2.50 0.20 6 2.02 0.20 0.48 0.28
>48 months spell 6 3.44 0.28 6 2.95 0.28 0.49 0.40
Hazard to other
Constant 6 3.01 0.03 6 2.96 0.051
Woman 6 0.0021 0.042
Working Partner 0.30 0.044
Child support 6 0.12 0.046
Highly educated 6 0.020 0.072        
Disabled 0.21 0.096
age 25-35 years 6 0.15 0.053
age 35-45 years  6 0.14 0.064
age 45-65 years 6 0.20 0.065
6-12 months spell 6 0.060 0.054 6 0.026 0.055 0.034  0.077
12-24 months spell 6 0.68 0.063 6 0.66 0.063 0.020 0.089
24-36 months spell 6 0.82 0.084 6 0.81 0.085 0.018 0.12
36-48 months spell 6 0.99 0.11 6 0.98 0.11 0.017 0.16
>48 months spell 6 1.31 0.12 6 1.31 0.12 0.0003 0.1611
Table 6 Analysing the sorting effect: comparing equations 3 and 4
(Unemployment benefits)
Equation 3 Equation 4  Difference
Number of observations 11465 11465
Log-likelihood 6 36460.0 6 35670.6
Variable coefficient std. error coefficient std. error coefficient std. error
Constant 6 2.08 0.014 6 1.73 0.027
Woman 6 0.21 0.027
Working Partner 0.094 0.028
Child support 0.018 0.030
Highly educated 0.20 0.061
Disabled 6 1.26 0.089
age 25-35 years 6 0.23 0.034
age 35-45 years  6 0.32 0.039
age 45-65 years 6 1.08 0.044
6-12 months spell 6 0.62 0.036 6 0.46 0.036 0.17 0.036
12-24 months spell 6 1.41 0.052 6 1.12 0.054 0.29 0.052
24-36 months spell 6 2.05 0.11 6 1.61 0.11 0.44 0.11
36-48 months spell 6 2.64 0.22 6 2.15 0.23 0.49 0.22
>48 months spell 6 3.06 0.31 6 2.71 0.31 0.35 0.31
Hazard to other destinations
Constant 6 2.97 0.023 6 2.64 0.041
Woman 6 0.22 0.038
Working Partner 6 0.13 0.039
Child support 6 0.010 0.044
Highly educated 0.17 0.091
Disabled 0.48 0.056
age 25-35 years 6 0.21 0.052
age 35-45 years  6 0.39 0.059
age 45-65 years 6 0.58 0.055
6-12 months spell 6 0.22 0.048 6 0.14 0.049 0.086 0.068
12-24 months spell 6 0.50 0.056 6 0.37 0.059 0.13 0.081
24-36 months spell 6 0.46 0.083 6 0.25 0.086 0.22 0.12
36-48 months spell 6 0.36 0.12 6 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.16
>48 months spell 6 0.26 0.14 6 0.053 0.14 0.20 0.2012
who have received disability benefits in the past are less able to find a job. Further, age
has a strong negative effect on finding jobs, while the impact of education is positive.
The impact of these variables is less pronounced for the hazard to other destinations than
work.
Tables 5 and 6 still reveal a clear pattern of negative duration dependence, also after
correcting for a number of individual characteristics. In the SA and UI benefits
programmes, the cumulated duration effect on the hazard diminishes then by 20 to 25
%. After a spell of three to four years, the sorting process in both programmes seems to
have ended; further decreases in the outflow are probably caused only by unbiased
duration effects (see column with differences between the equations). Further, attention
should be paid to the remarkable similarity between duration dependence in both
benefits, before and after correction for observed individual characteristics. This,
however, does not withstand the fact that the absolute level of the probability of finding
a job is significantly higher for people with UI benefits. Also, it is remarkable that the
results for the SA programme do not point to any sorting process in the outflow to other
destinations, like non-activity or pensions; this is in sharp contrast to the same outflow
from the UI programme. This is caused by the the maximum length of the period of
entitlement for UI benefits.  When this period has ended, unemployed workers start
receiving SA benefits.
The IPR data provide us with a limited number of administrative characteristics of
individuals.  Probably more characteristics are relevant in explaining differences in the
hazard to work. In practice, the separation of individual duration dependence and the
effects of unobserved characteristics is difficult. We used two methods described earlier
to test for the importance of unobserved characteristics. First, a model was estimated in
which the error terms of the hazard rates are assumed to follow a Gamma distribution.
The estimated parameter, describing the dispersion of this distribution, converges to a
value close to zero, thus indicating that unobservable differences are not very important.
We also employed the non-parametric method, in which we distinguish between
different subgroups with different levels of hazard rates. This also gives no indication
of unobservable heterogeneity. These results contrast with other studies with Dutch data,
for example Abbring (1997) and Opstal et al. (1995) who find larger effects. 
All in all, we believe that the use of additional information (describing part of the
heterogeneity that is unobserved in the current analysis), for example on the motivation
of the unemployed, may improve the accuracy of profiling techniques. However, our
results stress the importance of individual duration effects, thus limiting the reach of
profiling at the moment of inflow into unemployment. Unemployed job seekers - both13
in UI and SA - fastly become discouraged, lose their working skills and/or become
stigmatized by potential employers. Therefore,  targeting specific groups (at the moment
of inflow into unemploment) alone bears a great risk of long term unemployment for
those unemployed that are (initially) classified as having good job prospects.
6 Conclusions
To sum up, observed characteristics derived from a registered database (the IPR) can
explain negative duration dependence to only a small degree. This suggests that either
unobserved differences, or individual duration effects play a more important role. Our
results indicate that unobserved differences are not very important. We think that more
individual information may be helpful in obtaining a more accurate system of profiling,
reducing deadweight risks. However, duration dependence effects at the individual level
are more important. Therefore, labor market policies should not rely on profiling at the
start of an unemployment spell, but also on supplemental policies, for example by
encouraging search activities of all workers that have spent a certain length of time in
unemployment.14
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Appendix: Specification of the hazard
In the context of our model, the so called hazard rate measures the rate at which
unemployed workers flow out of SA of UI benefit programmes, either into work or to
other destinations. This rate, ￿, is measured as the probability of leaving SA or UI over
a specific (small) time interval [T, T+dt], given that one has received benefit up to T:
(1)  ￿ = Pr( T < t < T+dt | t ￿ T )
In our model, the time interval dt is equal to one month. The hazards or ‘competing
risks’ have a proportional (or log-linear) structure. First, we specify the two risks as a
piece-wise constant that depends only on the elapsed time in the SA or UI benefit
programme:
(2)  ￿_b,i(ti)  =  exp[ c0,b + c1,b I(6 < ti ￿ 12) + c2,b I(12 <  ti ￿ 24) + c3,b I(24 < ti ￿ 36)
  + c4,b I(36 < ti ￿ 48) + c5,b I(ti > 48) ]
in which:
ti  is the elapsed time of receiving benefits of individual i
b  indicates, respectively, the hazard to work (b=w) and to other destinations (b=o)
I  is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the elapsed duration lies within a certain
time interval 
If we look at the results in table 6, for example, then we find that the hazard to work in
the second half year in the SA benefit programme is equal to exp(- 0,7408)￿ 47% of that
of the first half year.
In equations 1 and 3 we estimate the model according to (2). The hazard specification
can extended by adding individual characteristics (see equations 2 and 4):
(3) ￿_b,i(t)  =  exp[ ￿ ￿ xi + c0,b + c1,b I(6 < t ￿ 12) + c2,b I(12 <  t ￿ 24)
  + c3,b I(24 < t ￿ 36) + c4,b I(36 < t ￿ 48) + c5,b I(t > 48) ]
in which vector x = describes individual differences (like age, gender, etc..).16
Also in this case the parameters describe proportional differences and can therefore
easily be interpreted. For example, 45 to 65 year-olds in the SA programme have a
hazard to work that is, ceteris paribus, only 21% (exp(-1.5511)) of that of young people
under 25 years of age.  17
Abstract
It is well-known that the probability of an unemployed person finding a job decreases
over the unemployment spell. On the one hand, this results from duration dependence
at the individual level: unemployed job seekers may become discouraged, loose their
working skills and become stigmatized by potential employers (‘pure’ individual
effects). On the other hand, if there is variation between individual exit rates, there is
dynamic sorting of the unemployed with low exit probabilities (‘sorting effects’). Based
on Dutch micro-data of social assistance (SA) and unemployment insurance
beneficiaries (UI) for 1989-1996,  we investigate to what extent this so-called ‘negative
duration dependence’ is due to sorting effects, as well as ‘pure’ individual effects. The
analysis suggests that after an unemployment spell of half a year, the decrease in the job
finding rate for SA recipients can be attributed for 20% to 25% to sorting effects. After
a three- to four-year period, the probability to find a job deteriorates further, but only
due to individual duration effects. For UI recipients, similar results are found. From this,
we conclude that profiling measures that target  the inflow of unemployed with bad job
prospects bear an important risk: unemployed that are initially classified as having good
job prospects may also become long-term unemployed. Therefore, labor market policies
should also focus on general measures, for example, by encouraging search activities
of all workers that have spent a certain length of time in unemployment